This paper assesses the feasibility of developing quantitative relationships between the capability of aviation units to perform their assigned missions and the level of resources available to them for training. It responds to skepticism about the impact of reductions in the number of flying hours available for aircrew training on aircrew performance.
TABLES
.
Career Flying Experience, Bombing Accuracy and Landing Grades. 11 Table 6 .
Safety and Experience in Navy Tactical Aviation --Mishaps per
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to develop quantitative relationships between the capability of aviation units to perform their assigned missions and the level of resources available to them, using information on the performance of aircrew personnel. It is meant to directly address concerns voiced by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and skepticism displayed by Congress about the impact of cuts to the flying-hour programs of the services.
The study is designed to be performed in three phases. This paper reports on the results of the first phase. Our goal here is to show that it is feasible to build the kinds of quantitative relationships between capability and resources that we seek to develop. Phase two will be designed to produce illustrative examples of such relationships. If the first two phases are successful, phase three is meant to initiate a broad research effort covering all the services and a wide range of aircraft types.
Our general approach is statistical. We want to use statistical techniques to examine historical data in order to relate indicators of proficiency, including indicators of safety, to training histories. This requires data on the output of the training process --proficiency --as well as data on the inputs --principally flying-hour histories, but including, where possible, information on the use of simulators. It also requires a conceptual framework for linking the two.
The rest of the paper is divided into six sections. The first describes the concerns that motivate this study. The second section reviews the sparse but interesting body of literature relating aspects of aircrew performance to flying hours. After that, a model for relating flying-hour activity to aircrew performance is developed. This is followed by a description of the data on aircrew performance that have been identified in our initial explorations and a discussion of our plans to analyze that data. The paper ends with conclusions.
We find that historical information can be successfully used to quantify the effects of training and experience on aircrew proficiency and safety. We also find that data exist to support such quantification. All the necessary data to perform two case studies relating flying hours to proficiency measures have been obtained. Analyses of these data are proceeding and more data sets are being developed.
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II. BACKGROUND
All of the military services spend a considerable amount of money flying aircraft in peacetime. This includes expenditures on aviation fuel, on spare parts and on full-time maintenance personnel. Most of this flying is for the purpose of maintaining and upgrading the proficiency of aircrew personnel. Recently doubts have been raised about the extent to which changes in levels of flying-hour activity would increase or decrease the ability of aircrews to effectively perform the tasks for which they are being trained, and which they might have to execute in a hostile environment.
A recent report on aircrew training by the General Accounting Office (GAO) notes that the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) base their criteria for determining how many flying hours are needed to maintain and enhance pilot and crew proficiency largely on the judgment of experienced pilots. It finds that the Air Force does not have a system for aggregating and analyzing data used as the basis for its professional judgments [I]. The report concludes that there is a need to develop and maintain a system for using objective data to assess the benefits pilots and aircrews receive from different levels of flying.
GAO's findings reflect widespread Congressional skepticism about the validity of the requirements for flying hours stated by each of the services. This skepticism has manifested itself in continuing pressure on the flying-hour budget. Congress has not been satisfied with the services' responses to requests that they show the implications of changes in flying hours for aL-crew performance. Traditionally these responses rely heavily on the methodology used to develop flying hour programs. Figure 1 presents an overview of that methodology.
Every aircrew for each type of aircraft has a set of missions to execute and a set of tasks that must be performed to execute them. The frequency with which these tasks must be repeated to maintain proficiency is based on informed professional judgment and observation. These tasks and frequencies combine to form the training syllabus. Required training programs are built from the number of hours needed to execute the syllabus and the
number of crews to be trained. The requirement to do non-training-related operational tasks ought to be added in, but often is not. Some training is performed in simulators.
That portion of the training program for which simulators are not available or felt to be not suitable determines the flying-hour requirement. Flying this number of hours is expected to yield the needed level of aircrew proficiency. Generally the required number of flying hours determined by this methodology exceeds the actual number that can be bought with the flying-hour budget. Presumably the greater the difference between the actual and required programs, the greater the difference between actual and required aircrew proficiency.
Questions concerning the implications of changing the flying-hour budget can be answered by reference to the training syllabus. Less flying implies that more of the required tasks will not be fully trained for and that aircrews will not be qualified to perform as many of their missions. The weakness of this estimate of the impact of reduced flying is that it is not validated by explicit reference to the actual performance of any group of aviators. Except for a few isolated cases, the services have not been able to point to two
groups of aircrews and demonstrate that the group that lew more could perform better.
A reason for this situation is that making such a comparison requires data on indicators of the military performance of aircrews. It is hard to measure military performance. Researchers have noted "the lack of information on job performance resulting from training [2] ." A recent paper, however, showed this lack to be less pervasive than is widely believed. All the services go to considerable effort to develop indicators that are closely related to military effectiveness (3] . They are generally used for management purposes in the field. They are usually not forwarded to higher headquarters or used to assess the effectiveness of manpower, personnel and training policies.
III. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Most of the existing literature on the relationship between flying hours and aircrew performance has been developed using Navy data, though one particularly ambitious study examined tactical bombing performance in the Air Force. These studies use a diverse set of variables to reflect performance. The performance indicators include final grades on Operational Readiness Evaluations (OREs), boarding rates for carrier-based aircraft, carrier landing grades, accident rates and bombing accuracy. Some of the analyses focus on recent flying hours, while some examine the total number of flying hours accumulated over the course of a career.
A. RECENT FLYING HOURS AND FINAL ORE GRADES
The first analysis of this sort that we know of was done at the Center for Naval [5] . Although the OREs were given to entire air wings, performance was judged by squadron. The CNA analysis studied the performance of fighter and attack squadrons --squadrons of F-4s, F-14s, A-6s and A-7s.
ORE information was gathered from both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Overall performance in OREs was established via a qualitative grade. These grades were outstanding (the highest grade), low outstanding, high excellent and excellent (the lowest observed grade). This taxonomy is somewhat misleading. Grades of excellent were considered to reflect badly on a squadron. Atlantic Fleet staff members felt that OREs were the best indicator of a squadron's proficiency at the time of the exercise. Pacific Fleet staff members were somewhat less effusive, but still supported their use for analytic purposes.
OREs were tests of operational performance that were graded by observers from outside the airwing (they are no longer given today). Fleet staff members believed that a squadron's overall grade might be less objective than some other specific pieces of information about the evaluations, such as carrier landing grades and boarding rates, which were felt to be particularly objective. All three of these performance indicators were used in the CNA analysis with consistent results. The correlation between average flying hours and the evaluation grade is clear. A statistical analysis of these data implied that a ten percent decrease in flying hours would result in a 34 percent decrease in the number of squadrons rated outstanding.
Final ORE grades had the virtue of reflecting the totality of squadron performance during the evaluation. They were meant to measure overall proficiency. They were, however, imprecise. It is impossible, for example, to know how much worse high excellent is than low outstanding. We also do not know the degree to which scoring differed among graders. Fortunately, final grades are not the only performance indicator that were saved after OREs. Analyses of both boarding rates and landing grades observed during the OREs reinforce the analysis of final grades. Table 2 shows the result of deriving a linear relationship between flying hours in the months prior to the ORE and the carrier boarding rate during the ORE. The boarding rate is the fraction of attempted arrested landing passes that are successful. Unsuccessful attempts require an additional pass. 12 number of observations = 88 * significant at the 1% level Another way of wAriting the equation depicted in Table 2 is: Boarding rate = 81.9 +
B. RECENT FLYING HOURS AND CARRIER BOARDING RATES
.022 x monthly flying hours. An implication of this equation is that a ten percent decrease in flying was estimated to yield a ten percent increase in unsuccessful landings.' While only a small fraction of the variance in boarding rates was explained, flying hours were highly significant. This means that we cannot do a great job of predicting the boarding rate of any particular squadron, but we can be very confident that if flying hours are cut squadrons in general will experience more unsuccessful landings.
C. RECENT FLYING HOURS AND LANDING GRADES
Every carrier landing is graded by the Landing Signal Officer (LSO) on a four point scale (from 1, the lowest grade, to 4). An analysis of landing grades received during the OREs yielded even more statistically significant, if perhaps less quantitatively important, results. Table 3 shows the results of this analysis. The number of unssuccessful landings would increase from ten percent of total landings to eleven percent of total landings. This is a ten percent increase in the number of unsuccessful landings.
The results imply that a ten percent cut in flying hours would have reduced average landing grades from 3.33 to 3.28 in the squadrons that underwent the OREs in the sample. This would have dropped a squadron with median average landing proficiency to the 38th percentile of the squadrons analyzed in the study.
D. RECENT FLYING HOURS AND BOMBING ACCURACY
The final analysis performed as part of the initial CNA work was not based on OREs. Rather it examined the effect of land-based preparation prior to carrier deployment for an A-6 squadron between February and October of 1983. The indicator of performance was how close to the target the aircraft dropped their bombs. Four kinds of bombing runs were included in the analysis. Over 2500 bombing runs went into producing the data.
Since flying-hour information was only available for the entire squadron on a monthly basis, the statistical work was done on an aggregate monthly basis. For each of the four kinds of bombing runs the average miss distance was calculated for every month. To put the four kinds of runs on a comparable basis, each monthly observation was normalized by dividing it by the grand average for that kind of run. Thus, there were 36 monthly observations of normalized bombing accuracy, accuracy relative to average accuracy for the same kind of run.
The examined hypothesis was that practice bombing improves bombing performance (lowers the miss distance). The researchers were able to distinguish time that could have been used to practice bombing (which occurred at Whidbey Island Naval Air Station) from other flying activity (which occurred elsewhere). Table 4 shows the results of looking at normalized bombing accuracy as a function of the amount of flying done at Whidbey Island in the previous month.
The expected relationship holds. Quantitatively, it means that a ten percent cut in flying would increase the average miss distance by 5.2 percent. The work cited so far looks at some measure of proficiency as a function of recent flying experience. This is the essential element postulated in the development of flying hour programs, but it isn't the only mechanism likely to be at work. As pilots accumulate flying hours over the course of their careers, they are likely to get more proficient independent of their recent flying experience. This cumulative effect was investigated in a recent Navy study that examined the performance of A-7 pilots in the Western Pacific and at Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada. The study found total flying hours to have a significant and substantial effect on both bombing accuracy and landing grades [6] . The analysis did not include individuals with less than 300 hours of experience in jets.
As Table 5 shows, between 300 hours and 2400 hours, a doublLng of experience is associated with about 13 percent greater bombing accuracy and with landing grades about 15 percent closer to a grade of 4. Little improvement was discernible above 2400 hours 
F. TOTAL PILOT EXPERIENCE AND ACCIDENT RATES
The Naval Safety Center has studied accident rates for Navy tactical aircraft as a function of accumulated pilot experience [7] . Table 6 summarizes the results of this work. 
------------------------Hours in Model -------------------
Under M0 301-500 501-1000 Over 1Q0
6.52 4.02 3.69 2.49
A statistically significant correlation was found. Pilots who had flown under 300 hours in a particular model of aircraft were about 2.6 times as likely to have an accident as pilots with over 1000 hours of experience.
A factor that complicates interpretation of the results displayed in Tables 5 and 6 is the probability that causality runs both ways. Not only are more experienced pilots likely to be better pilots because they master the necessary skills; intrinsically better pilots are more likely to continue flying long enough to become experienced pilots. This latter relationship pertains both because people are more likely to stick with a job they are particularly good at and because pilots with an especially strong aptitude for flying are less likely to crash early in their careers. Nonetheless, the effect of experience on skill is probably the principal mechanism behind the results reported here. The tables show considerable improvement in proficiency by the time 600 hours of experience is reached. Pilots typically reach this level of experience before they have a chance to leave the service.
Accidents are not prevalent enough to have a marked impact on the correlation between skill and experience in the pilot population.
G. BOMBING ACCURACY RELATED TO TOTAL PILOT EXPERIENCE AND RECENT FLYING HOURS
The most detailed attempt to model the relationship between flying history and pilot proficiency was undertaken in a recent Air Force study [8] . Bombing accuracy was studied for pilots of both the F-16 and the A-10. Alone among the studies we have reviewed, this one tried to relate proficiency to both the recent and long-term flying experience of pilots.
A complex model of skill growth and deterioration was used to depict the impact of recent flying experience on bombing accuracy. The researchers found that it was best to qpply this model separately to pilots with high career experience (over 900 hours in the F-16 and over 1400 hours in the A-10) and lower career experience. This was because of observed correlation between accumulated experience and bombing accuracy. We now turn to a brief discussion of the framework we plan to use to analyze relationships between flying hours and aircrew performance. This will prepare the way for a description of the data on both performance and training histories that we have uncovered in our investigations, and for consideration of the suitability of the data for the kind of analysis v,-contemplate.
IV.
MODELING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FLYING HOURS AND AIRCREW PROFICIENCY A. CONCEPTUAL MODEL
As a result of our literature review, we will adopt a model in which the experience gained through flying more hours manifests itself in two ways: (1) a short-term refreshing of skills that erode without practice, but that can be fairly easily relearned and (2) long-term mastery effects from the incremental increase of total experience over a long period of time. At the present time, only the first of these mechanisms is used to build and justify the flying-hour programs of the services.
Of the studies we have reviewed, only the Air Force study by Cedel and Fuchs examined both effects [8] . Separate relationships between recent flying experience and bombing accuracy were estimated for experienced and inexperienced personnel, with the upper and lower limits of pilot capability modeled as a function of pilot experience. For each group, bombing score was predicted as a function of the time between bombing flights. Unfortunately, they were not successful in finding as pronounced a short-run effect as other researchers have found. This may have been due to the specific model of short-term benefit they used.
We expect to quantify both the short-and long-run effects using multiple regression. Performance is hypothesized to depend on such factors as accumulated flying time, the number of events in a given time period and the elapsed time between events. We also hypothesize an interactive effect between total and recent experience, since total experience may affect how quickly skills are honed and how quickly they decay. Cedel and Fuchs found some support for this latter hypothesis.
If our approach is successful, it should be possible to establish both short-and long-run criteria for flight hour programs. Flying-hour programs would then be oriented to assuring not only that short-run qualification standards are met, but also that a specified fraction of pilots surpass target levels of accumulated experience. A crew member's ability to perform the required mission on call depends on his capability when he is called. Capability when called (readiness), according to the above hypotheses, depends on recent experience and total experience. If the hypotheses are confirmed, each should be a factor in determining the flying-hour program.. Determination to achieve a more experienced mix of pilots is likely not only to enhance combat capability, but to serve the additional purpose of reducing recruiting and initial training costs.
B. STATISTICAL MODEL
We hypothesize that the effects of short-run variables, such as days since last practice or number of flight hours in the last time period (week, month, two months, etc.) will depend on the level of experience the individual aircrewman has. We will test this hypothesis using a functional form which allows us to estimate the effect of interactions.
The basic model is: y = a 0 + a 1 EXP + a 2 X + a 3 (X)(EXP) + u, where y = Performance measure, such as bombing accuracy, carrier landing grades, etc. EXP = Experience, such as total flight hours, total time in type, total time in model, etc. A second experience variable, reflecting experience in simulators will be added in some formulations. X = Short-run variable, such as time since last practice, flight hours or practice flights in the previous week/month/six months, etc. In some formulations X will be a vector of short-run variables. This will allow examination of the possibility that different kinds of recent training (e.g., training in simulators) affect proficiency differently. In these cases a 2 and a 3 will also be vectors. a 0 = constant a 1 , a 2 , a 3 are coefficients and u is an error term., Different versions of this equation will be estimated using various functional forms (such as linear, logarithmic and logit) depending on the data. Mairs et al. found the distribution of A-7 bomb accuracy to be approximately log normal. In log form, the above equation is a generalized translog production function [9] . The term that includes both the short-run and experience variables (sometimes called the interaction term) provides information about how the importance of one factor varies with the level of the other.
This analytic approach offers the potential for investigating the effect of competition for resources between different missions. Ultimately we hope to look at proficiency in the performance of individual missions as a function of time spent practicing that mission and time spent practicing other missions. This will allow us to address a major problem expressed by many operators: trying to maintain some minimum level of proficiency in all required missions with limited resources.
V. DATA AVAILABILITY AND SUITABILITY
To demonstrate the feasibility of developing statistical relationships between flying hours and performance for a range of aircraft types, we need data on aircrew performance and flying hour histories for the same aircrews. A wide variety of such data exist. This section discusses our investigations and the data we found. Existing performance data are described in terms of their availability, relevance and reliability. Information on aircrew performance is usually not kept at a central location. If it exists, it tends to exist in the field. Our investigations into the availability of data have taken us to SAC headquarters at Offut AFB outside of Omaha, to Little Rock AFB, where C-130 training is done, to the Navy Safety Center in Norfolk, to the U.S.S, Eisenhower at sea, to the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and to an Army Combat Aviation Brigade at Fort Carson, Colorado. In addition, Washington offices of all four services have been visited. TAC headquarters at Langley AFB was visited as part of an earlier, related study effort.
These visits have identified a great deal of apparently available data. In selecting performance measures to be examined in this study, two principal criteria were used: relevance and reliability. Relevance means that, when properly measured, the variable reflects mission-related performance. Reliability means that there is good reason to believe that measurements are being made in an accurate, reproducible fashion. Some measures. such as bombing scores from an instrumented range, are clearly reliable. Reliability is related to objectivity, the absence of subjectively based variations in measurement, but, the presence of human judgment in the grading process does not necessarily imply a lack of reliability. In cases in which human judgment is present, one should also evaluate the importance attached to the grading process, the degree of standardization of the grading criteria, and the potential consequences of not following the criteria. Most of the data are also clearly reliable. The bombing and missile scores are derived from physical or electronic measurement by outside observers. The Navy Air Combat Maneuvering Range (ACMR) data are developed by electronic means on an instrumented range. 2 So are AIREM data. Navy boarding rates are determined by direct computation based on whether or not the pilot successfully completes an intended full-stop landing. Carrier landing grades incorporate some degree of subjectivity, but, as was noted above, they are characterized by a high degree of standardization and the risk of adverse consequences for inflated grading.
Flight checks are graded by certified examiners. In the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, care is taken to insure as much objectivity as possible. Evaluation content and grading criteria are standardized in detail by aircraft model and series. In most cases specified procedures leave little room for subjectivity by the evaluator. Most criteria are stated in quantitative terms, such as how much variation from a desired altitude level is allowed. If altitude varies less than that amount, the grade for the maneuver is a pass; otherwise it is a fail. Each model is managed by a Type Commander or Major Command and the results are taken very seriously by the services. Research into the variation of grades over evaluators is currently being conducted by the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory. We are inclined to believe that Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps flight check grades are reliable enough to be included in our empirical analyses, but the on-going research should be followed for additional evidence on this point.
While the Army relies on its flight checks as the other services do, the evaluation criteria appear to be specified in somewhat less detail, raising the risk of subjectivity and unreliability. Unfortunately, flight evaluations are the only performance measure we have been able to gather for Army helicopter crewmen. Any quantitative work that is based on these data should be treated as exploratory.
Turning to data on flying-hour activity, the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps all have centrally available, automated information on the flying-hour histories of individual aircrew members. The Air Force Operations Resource Management System (AFORMS) is a standardized reporting and data base system for training information. Current experience and training data are maintained for all active duty personnel. Information includes experience (total and by aircraft type), combat time, and monthly flight time and sorties during the current six month period. AFORMS is kept at the Major Command level. It feeds the HORIS (Hormats' Information System) data base which is maintained at Air Force Headquarters. HORIS keeps monthly data for a year and annual data before that.
In January 1987 the Navy began to use the Naval Flight Information Reporting System (NAVFLIRS). It includes data on flying hours and simulator usage. NAVFLIRS data must be submitted after every flight. Before the institution of NAVFLIRS, the Navy used the Individual Flight Activity Reporting System (IFARS). NAVFLIRS and IFARS data are summarized by month and fiscal year. Validated TARS data are available from the Naval Safety Center.
The Marine Corps also uses NAVFLIRS. Its Flight Readiness and Data System (FREDS) was the forerunner of NAVFLIRS. In January 1987, the Marines began to report ordnance delivery performance to NAVFLIRS.
The Army does not have centralized information on the flying-hour histories of its aircrewmen. Hard copy records are kept at the brigade level.
VI. PLANNED AND PROSPECTIVE ANALYSES
Suitable data appear to be available to perform many different analyses of quantitative relationships between flying hours and relevant and reliable measures of aircrew performance or safety. In view of the limited resources available for phase two of this study, choices must be made about which analyses to perform and the order in which to perform them. These choices will be made according to three criteria: the speed with which data are acquired, the desire to produce analyses covering as wide a range of services and aircraft types as possible, and policy interest in particular services, aircraft types or measures of performance. An example of policy interest is the desirability of addressing the GAO's comments on the supportability of the flying-hour programs for TAC and SAC aircraft.
We want to develop as many quantitative relationships as possible. In the first phase of this project, requests have been made for data from many sources. Under such circumstances, researchers cannot always predict what data they will be able to acquire first. The data that we were able to acquire first are not necessarily the data we most want to analyze, but the way to expedite the development of quantitative relationships is to analyze data as they become available, rather than let acquired data sit unanalyzed while effort is focused on acquiring additional data. Decisions concerning what data sets to try to develop next will be made according to the second and third criteria.
We plan to start our empirical work by analyzing two data sets that have already been assembled. These initial studies will examine the impact of variations in flying hours on the accuracy with which Marine Corps aviators deliver air-to-giound ordnance and on various measures of performance for Navy tactical aviation. The remainder of this section begins by providing an overview of the initial studies. Our preferences about what additional studies to pursue are then discussed.
A. MARINE CORPS ANALYSIS
The Marine Corps data set is the richest, in detail and number of observations, of those in hand. Performance measures, however, are limited to air-to-ground ordnance delivery. In January 1987 the Marine Corps began entering air-to-ground accuracy for all flights for which an outside observer was present. In most cases the outside observer is located at an instrumented range. The data set includes information on performance, shortrun experience and total experience. 
C. PROSPECTIVE ANALYSES
As the two analyses described above proceed, data will be gathered to permit additional case studies to be performed. The top priority will be placed on trying to extend the work to examine the determinants of performance in Air Force and Army aircraft. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the results of an investigation into the practicability of using a statistical approach to develop quantitative relationships between the prior training received by aircrew personnel and indicators that are clearly related to how well they can be expected to perform in combat. Our conclusions are:
1. It is feasible to relate flying-hour activity to operational performance and safety measures. It has been done. While the research in this area has not been extensive, the published analyses have generally produced results that seem to be credible. Quantitative relationships of the kind we seek have been developed. They support the proposition that more flying results in measurably better performance. This has been demonstrated for both Air Force and Navy aircrews.
2. There is reason to believe that additional flying affects the level of aircrew proficiency in two ways. In the short run it appears to hone skills and prevent their deterioration. In the long run it permits aircrew members to achieve a higher level of mastery that is reflected in better performance. None of the existing analyses that were reviewed fully captured both of these effects. Only one tried. Empirical work should follow an approach that allows both the short-run and long-run effects of variations in flying hours on aircrew proficiency to be quantified.
3. Proficiency data exist for all the aircraft types we have investigated. In most cases they are both relevant to our purpose and clearly objective. In addition, most of the indicators of proficiency that reflect evaluator judgment are developed in a highly structured fashion that seems to preclude much undesirable subjectivity.
4. The services are willing to support efforts to gather the data that are needed to perform statistical analyses.
5.
Data exist to develop links between flying-hour activity and measures of operational performance and safety for a wide range of aircraft. Both justification and formation of flying-hour policies would benefit from them. Additional research to build such links should be supported.
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